A local artist's rendition of the Black Hawk Downincident in Mogadishu, Somalia. Photo Credit: Peter Tobia. Image above obtained from the Smithsonian Magazine.
"We started this mission for the right reasons, and we're going to finish it in the right way. In a sense, we came to Somalia to rescue innocent people in a burning house. We've nearly put the fire out, but some smoldering embers remain. If we leave them now, those embers will reignite into flames, and people will die again. If we stay a short while longer and do the right things, we've got a reasonable chance of cooling off the embers and getting other firefighters to take our place." -- President Bill Clinton, October 7, 1993 Address on Somalia
For as Long as It Takes? Time Horizons and Foreign Policy Change
Pacific Stars and Stripes reporting the signing of the peace agreement, bringing American involvement in the Vietnam War to an end. Image obtained from the National Museum of the United States Air Force.
Despite the importance of time preferences in international relations, few works address the origins of these preferences or directly test their impact on decision-making and policy outcomes. Time horizons are particularly important for international relations because war produces strong short-term political pressures, but victory may only be attainable through patient, long-term commitment. This problem is apparent when we consider the analysis of foreign policies: when do foreign policies end? How can we explain foreign policy continuity and change? I answer this by systematizing the conditions under which leaders possess long- versus short-time horizons. I identify two contributors to leader time horizons: culpability (threats to political survival for initiating or escalating a coercive foreign policy) and leader satisfaction with the policy. I argue that leaders possess short time horizons when they are not culpable from domestic or international audiences and are personally dissatisfied with the existing policy. In turn, leaders end policies when they have short---rather than long---time horizons. I test these claims using survey experiments to uncover the sources of time horizons individually; large-N cross-national analyses to develop a novel measure of leader time horizons across space and time; and archival research on historical cases of US leadership in coercive foreign policy decision-making in the post-World War II era (Johnson [1963-1969] and Nixon [1969-1973] in Vietnam, Nixon on China [1972], Reagan in Lebanon [1984], and Bill Clinton in Somalia [1993]). This project contributes directly to how the field understands commitment problems and resolve, and specifies the mechanisms by which leaders are constrained in foreign policy decision-making. I show that while resolve is a result of long time horizons, long time horizons do not always result in resolved behavior in international politics.
Survey respondent time horizons following a culpability treatment (public backlash) for both military intervention and economic sanctions policy vignettes.
I use computational models to construct cross-national measures of leader time horizons. The image above plots the predicted values of culpability, satisfaction, and time horizons at the leader level in the post-World War II era.
My research has been supported by the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. While there, I worked primarily in the White House Central Files and the National Security Files, as well as personal correspondence between LBJ and his staff. I use statements by presidents or those speaking on their behalf as much as possible to qualitatively measure time horizons.
"With you, I believe that time, patience, and freedom to work, will allow the normal processes of political action to create in South Vietnam a society responsive to the people and consistent with their traditions. We must remain in Vietnam to permit that peaceful change to work its way."
Letter, Lyndon Johnson to Mr. J.J. del Castillo, 4/27/66, EX ND 19/CO 312, WHCF, Box 220, LBJ Library.
"Once they become convinced that we are not weak; that we are not impatient; that we are not going to falter; that they cannot win; that the cost to them of their continued aggression is rising; that their bargaining position at a conference is getting weaker every day--then peace will come, whether at the negotiating table or not."
Letter, Lyndon Johnson to Mike Mansfield, 6/22/66, EX ND 19/C0 312, WHCF, Box 221, LBJ Library.
A New York Times report on President Reagan's decision to extend the intervention in Lebanon (September 21, 1983).
Cases of Presidential Decision-Making Examined Using Archival Records
Time horizons are invoked not only in presidential decision-making and rhetoric, but also in public discourse.
Article, "The Impatient Ones" from the Economist, 8/19/67, EX ND 19/C0 312, WHCF, Box 228, LBJ Library.