"With you, I believe that time, patience, and freedom to work, will allow the normal processes of political action to create in South Vietnam a society responsive to the people and consistent with their traditions. We must remain in Vietnam to permit that peaceful change to work its way."
Letter, Lyndon Johnson to Mr. J.J. del Castillo, 4/27/66, EX ND 19/CO 312, WHCF, Box 220, LBJ Library.
"Once they become convinced that we are not weak; that we are not impatient; that we are not going to falter; that they cannot win; that the cost to them of their continued aggression is rising; that their bargaining position at a conference is getting weaker every day--then peace will come, whether at the negotiating table or not."
Letter, Lyndon Johnson to Senator Mike Mansfield, 6/22/66, EX ND 19/C0 312, WHCF, Box 221, LBJ Library.
For as Long as It Takes? Time Horizons and Foreign Policy Change
Despite the importance of time preferences in international relations, few works address the origins of these preferences or directly test their impact on decision-making and policy outcomes. This problem is apparent when we consider puzzling outcomes like foreign policy change: when do leaders change course? When do foreign policies end? I address this fundamental policy question by systematizing the conditions underwhich leaders possess long- versus short-time horizons. I identify the conditions under which time preferences emerge: leader vulnerability and satisfaction with the current policy. I argue that leaders possess short time horizons and end policieswhen they are not vulnerable and are dissatisfied with the existing policy. I test this theory using an empirical strategy of triangulation: first, I rely on multiple survey experiments to identify the microfoundations of time horizons; second, I use computational tools and observational data to model and measure leader time horizons in the post-World War II era. Finally, I assess the validity of the theorized causal mechanism on historical cases of US Presidential foreign policymaking, including Lyndon Johnson (1963-1969) and Richard Nixon’s (1969-1973) handling of the war in Vietnam, and Ronald Reagan’s intervention in Lebanon (1982-1984). This project is the first to theorize both the sources and consequences of time horizons in decision-making, to specify the mechanisms by which leaders are constrained in the foreign policy process, and to identify the conditions under which policy termination and change are possible. Whereas previous research points to policy persistence as an inevitable and inescapable tendency, this work suggests that change is possible when leaders operate under certain situational and dispositional conditions.
I use computational models to construct cross-national measures of leader time horizons. The image above plots the predicted values of culpability, satisfaction, and time horizons at the leader level in the post-World War II era.
|
Survey respondent time horizons following a culpability treatment (public backlash) for both military intervention and economic sanctions policy vignettes.
|
|
|
My research has been supported by the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. While there, I worked primarily in the White House Central Files and the National Security Files, as well as personal correspondence between LBJ and his staff. I use statements by presidents or those speaking on their behalf as much as possible to qualitatively measure time horizons.
A New York Times report on President Reagan's decision to extend the intervention in Lebanon (September 21, 1983).
Cases of Presidential Decision-Making Examined Using Archival Records
An artist's rendering of the Black Hawk Down incident in Mogadishu. Image Credit: Peter Tobia, Smithsonian Magazine.
"We started this mission for the right reasons, and we're going to finish it in the right way. In a sense, we came to Somalia to rescue innocent people in a burning house. We've nearly put the fire out, but some smoldering embers remain. If we leave them now, those embers will reignite into flames, and people will die again. If we stay a short while longer and do the right things, we've got a reasonable chance of cooling off the embers and getting other firefighters to take our place."
-- President Bill Clinton, October 7, 1993 Address on Somalia
Time horizons are invoked not only in presidential decision-making and rhetoric, but also in public discourse.
Article, "The Impatient Ones" from the Economist, 8/19/67, EX ND 19/C0 312, WHCF, Box 228, LBJ Library.
